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In an opinion issued on Sept. 20 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, Judge David T. Thuma held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent a bankruptcy court from determining whether the automatic stay applies to pending state court litigation. See In re Shook, Case No. 24-10724-t7 (Bankr. N.M. Sept. 20, 2024) [ECF No. 54].

On 27 February 2024, the High Court sanctioned a restructuring plan (the Plan) proposed by CB&I UK Limited (CB&I), part of the global McDermott construction and engineering group (the Group). This is the first English restructuring plan to be approved after the Court of Appeal judgment in Adler (see our Alert) and follows the guidance in that case.

Background

On 23 January 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court's sanction of Adler Group's (Adler) restructuring plan (the Plan) (see our alert). This much anticipated judgment provides clarity on the court's discretion to sanction a plan where there are dissenting classes of creditors.

Background

The Plan envisaged:

Good afternoon. Following are this week’s summaries of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of December 18, 2023.

In Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit was asked to address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) – the federal statute providing for post-judgment interest – applies in adversary proceedings even though 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) doesn’t explicitly refer to bankruptcy courts.

Following are this week’s summaries of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of September 4, 2023.

In AssessNet Inc. v. Ferro Estate, the Court set aside an order dismissing the action, finding that the summary judgment motion judge had erred in determining the issue of discoverability of a claim against a trustee in bankruptcy.

Torgersrud v Lightstone is a family law decision where the Court dismissed an appeal from an order setting aside a marriage contract entered into in Quebec in 1988.

The Court of Appeal has recently referred to established case law that the court will only interfere with the act of an officeholder “if he has done something so utterly unreasonable and absurd that no reasonable man would have done it”.

While the judge in the lower court had not made any error of law, on the facts there were identifiable flaws in the judge's reasoning that the trustees' decision not to join in the proceedings was perverse.

The judge had failed to recognise that: