Trademark licensees that file for bankruptcy protection face uncertainty concerning their ability to continue using trademarks that are crucial to their businesses. Some of this stems from an unsettled issue in the courts as to whether a licensee can assume a trademark license without the licensor’s consent. In In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 2015 BL 44152 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015), a Delaware bankruptcy court reaffirmed that the ongoing controversy surrounding the “actual” versus “hypothetical” test for assumption of a trademark license has not abated.

In June 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case known as Stern v. Marshall. The U.S. Supreme Court held that filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case does not constitute consent to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over all counterclaims or actions that the bankruptcy estate may later bring against the creditor.

In fact, filing the proof of claim constitutes consent only to those claims or actions that either (1) stem from the bankruptcy case itself; or (2) are necessary to the resolution of the creditor’s proof of claim.  

When a traditional nonbanking company files a case under the Bankruptcy Code, a judge is appointed to be the neutral arbiter of disputes that arise between the debtor and its creditors.

Introduction

A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.