Judge Parker of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas recently issued an order in the case of Hilltop SPV, LLC, granting debtor Hilltop SPV LLC’s (“Hilltop”) motion to reject a Gas Gathering Agreement (“GGA”) with counter-party Monarch Midstream, LLC (“Monarch”).[1] This decision allows Hilltop to reject the GGA while allowing Monarch to retain the covenants that run with the land post-rejection.

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2017 (June 27, 2024)

The U.S. Supreme Court held last week in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. that an insurance company with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” with the right to object to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.

Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

Purchasers often relish the prospect of buying distressed assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a buyer may obtain ownership of bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear of any interest” (assuming certain conditions are met), and also be reasonably confident that the sale will not be reversed on appeal. But the U.S. Supreme Court may have now tempered that confidence. In its recent, unanimous opinion, MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, No. 21-1270 (Apr.

The American bankruptcy process is geared towards providing (a) financially distressed businesses and individuals with a “fresh start” and (b) their creditors a fair opportunity to address their claims. Much of that process takes place in bankruptcy courts all over the country on a daily basis. So, what effect does a pandemic, such as the novel coronavirus (and its attendant disease, COVID-19), have on the administration of bankruptcy cases in the U.S.? Of course, the federal, state and local restrictions on public gatherings create a challenge for U.S.

In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.

With its landmark ruling in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Tribune 1"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims asserted by creditors of the Tribune Co. ("Tribune") seeking to avoid payments to shareholders during a 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") as constructive fraudulent transfers were preempted by the "safe harbor" under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 9, 2016, the New York State Court of Appeals, in Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2016 BL 184648 (N.Y. June 9, 2016), reversed a lower court decision, consistent with the overwhelming majority of federal court decisions, that the common interest doctrine under New York law is not limited to communications made in connection with pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.

Yes, Gathering Agreements Can Be Rejected as Executory Contracts (At Least Under One Court’s Interpretation of Texas Law)

Can Gathering Agreements Be Rejected as Executory Contracts?