The High Court has recently granted a receiver's application for an order that the grantor company and its sole director deliver up documentation relating to the company's affairs.
Ribble Limited was placed into receivership. The receiver, Mr Whitley, wrote to Ribble's sole director, Mr Kooiman, seeking information necessary to identify collateral secured by a general security agreement (GSA) between Ribble and the secured creditor, under which Mr Whitley was appointed. Mr Kooiman opposed Mr Whitley's application, arguing that:
An appeal by Christchurch property developer, David Henderson, against the High Court decision imposing conditions on his discharge from bankruptcy has been dismissed.
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the courts will adopt "a practical business approach (as against one which is unduly technical)" to the determination of due debts when considering a company's ability to pay its due debts.
In Re Boart Longyear Ltd (No 2) the Supreme Court of New South Wales recently approved two creditor schemes of arrangement on the application of Boart Longyear Limited. The schemes were considerably amended after the Court indicated at the first hearing that it was not likely to approve the original schemes on fairness grounds. Significantly, the Court ordered the parties to attend a mediation to resolve the fairness issues – something that has not been done before in a scheme of arrangement in either Australia or the United Kingdom.
The English Court of Appeal has recently decided that a corporation that held shares in a company remained a shareholder notwithstanding the shareholding company's dissolution.
BWE Estates Limited had two shareholders: an individual named David who held 75% of its shares and a company, Belvedere Limited, which held the remaining 25%. Although Belvedere was dissolved in 1996, it remained listed as a shareholder in BWE's share register.
In the English High Court, the joint administrators of four English companies within the former Lehman Brothers group sought directions from the Court in respect of a proposed settlement. The settlement would put to rest substantial inter-company claims including those at issue in the 'Waterfall III' proceedings.
In a second application heard on the same day, Hildyard J considered an application by the administrators of Lehman Brothers Europe Limited (LBEL) for directions that would enable a surplus to be distributed to the sole member of LBEL while LBEL remained in administration. The proposed scheme had material benefits for both shareholders and creditors. The administrators acknowledged that the orders sought were an indirect means of circumventing the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), which does not expressly provide for directors to make distributions during an administration.
The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.
An important aspect of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 ("PROMESA")—the temporary stay of creditor collection efforts that came into effect upon its enactment—was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017), the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a lower court order denying two motions for relief from the PROMESA stay.
Only a handful of courts have had an opportunity to address the ramifications of rejection of a trademark license since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit handed down its landmark decision in Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Manuf., LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). A bankruptcy appellate panel for the First Circuit recently did so in Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC (In re Tempnology LLC), 559 B.R. 809 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).