Fulltext Search

Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan providing for the reorganization or liquidation of a debtor is the culmination of the chapter 11 process. To promote the fundamental policy of finality in that process, the general rule is that a final confirmation order is inviolable. The absence of certainty that the transactions effectuated under a plan are valid and permanent would undermine chapter 11's fundamental purpose as a vehicle for rehabilitating ailing enterprises and providing debtors with a fresh start.

The U.S. Supreme Court handed down three bankruptcy rulings to finish the Term ended in July 2024. The decisions address the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans, the standing of insurance companies to object to "insurance neutral" chapter 11 plans, and the remedy for overpayment of administrative fees in chapter 11 cases to the Office of the U.S. Trustee. We discuss each of them below.

U.S. Supreme Court Bars Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases in Chapter 11 Plans

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

The Bankruptcy Code invalidates "ipso facto" clauses in executory contracts or unexpired leases that purport to modify or terminate the contract or lease (or the debtor's rights or obligations under the contract or lease) based solely on the debtor's financial condition or the commencement of a bankruptcy case for the debtor. It also invalidates state law, rather than a contract, that purports to alter the property interests of the debtor. A more difficult situation arises when those interests are on the outer bounds of "property of the estate."

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.