In a judgment issued yesterday (Francis v Gross [2024] NZCA 528), the Court of Appeal unanimously overturned the controversial High Court decision in Francis v Gross [2023] NZHC 1107 and held that purchasers of partly constructed modular buildings (pods) did not have equitable liens (at all, and especially not in priority to secured creditors) over those pods.

A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.

This morning, after much anticipation, the Supreme Court has released its judgment in Yan v Mainzeal Property Construction Limited (in liq) [2023] NZSC 113, largely upholding the Court of Appeal's decision, and awarding damages of $39.8m against the directors collectively, with specified limits for certain directors. The decision signals that a strong emphasis on 'creditor protection' is now embedded in New Zealand company law.

In recent years much ink has been spilled opining on the so called 'Quincecare' duty of care, and the limits of it (see links to our recent insolvency law updates covering the topic below). The judgment in Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363 was a first instance decision on Steyn J, in which he found that a bank has a duty not to execute a payment instruction given by an agent of its customer without making inquiries if the bank has reasonable grounds for believing that the agent is attempting to defraud the customer.

The High Court recently issued its ruling in the matter of Re Avanti Communications Limited (in administration). It is the first major case since the pivotal 2005 House of Lords decision of Re Spectrum Plus  to examine the characteristics of fixed and floating charges.

Key points

In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

In the current times of financial stress, a borrower seeking to renegotiate or refinance existing financing arrangements may be asked by its lender to enhance or refresh its security package through the grant of a new floating charge.

The question of whether a floating charge can be avoided due to section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") can arise in such a context.

Void floating charges under section 245 of the IA 1986

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.

The issue

A "no action" clause will appear in almost all English law-governed bond trust deeds.

A no action clause provides that a bondholder (or anyone entitled to payments on the bonds) cannot, initially, proceed directly against the issuer. Instead, the right to bring a cause of action resides with the trustee and it is only if the trustee, having become bound to take action, fails to do so within a reasonable time (with the failure continuing) that a bondholder can then itself proceed directly against the issuer.

The High Court has, for the first time since the introduction of the legislation in June 2020, refused to sanction a cross-class cram-down restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act. In In the matter of Hurricane Energy Plc [2021] EWHC 1759 (Ch), the court rejected a plan supported by bondholders because it had not been shown that the opposing shareholders had no better alternative prospects (i.e., the ‘no worse off condition’ had not been met).