Although the automatic stay contained in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code theoretically extends worldwide, enforcing it against international creditors, particularly sovereigns, can present practical problems in its application. The chapter 11 cases of Kumtor Gold Company CJSC and Kumtor Operating Company CJSC (collectively, "Kumtor") pending before Judge Lisa Beckerman in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 21-11051) have been testing the practical application of the automatic stay's global reach since the commencement of the cases in late May 2021.

To encourage creditors, equity interest holders, indenture trustees and unofficial committees to take actions that benefit a bankruptcy estate, section 503(b)(3)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code confers administrative priority on their claims for expenses incurred in making a "substantial contribution" in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 case. Administrative expense status is also given under section 503(b)(4) to their claims for reimbursement of reasonable professional fees incurred in making a substantial contribution. The U.S.

In Feltman v. Noor Staffing Grp., LLC (In re Corp. Res. Servs. Inc.), 564 B.R. 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), the bankruptcy court considered whether section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a right of setoff when no such right is available under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The court concluded that section 553 does not create an independent federal right of setoff, but merely preserves any such right that exists under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court under certain circumstances to reopen a bankruptcy case even after the estate has been fully administered and the case is closed. In In re Atari, 2016 BL 125936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York explored the circumstances under which it may be appropriate to reopen a closed chapter 11 case.

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.