On August 14, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision holding that section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to the extent the transferee provided new value to the debtor,[1] does not require new value to remain unpaid as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed.

On June 20, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision sustaining the debtors’ objection to the proof of claim filed by Contrarian Funds, LLC.

When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

In Short

The Background: The administrators of an Australian auction house and gallery business applied to the Federal Court of Australia for directions to recover in excess of $1 million in fees and costs incurred with respect to performing a stocktake of the auction house's inventory and returning consigned goods to owners.

The Issue: Did an equitable lien exist over the consigned goods in favour of the administrators for their fees and costs and, if so, could the administrators recover those fees and costs?

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

The Federal Court of Australia has provided judicial guidance about what constitutes taking possession by seizure under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) ("PPSA"). Knauf Plasterboard Pty Ltd v Plasterboard West Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2017] FCA 866 indicates that a receiver taking possession of personal property in accordance with a valid security agreement will not perfect a security interest by way of possession.

Background

In Short

The Situation: Frequently, the statutory moratorium period provided to voluntary administrators to restructure an insolvent company is too short to find a solution. Administrators often utilise "holding" deeds of company arrangement to extend the period of moratorium and "buy" time to investigate potential restructuring opportunities for the future of the company. A creditor recently challenged this industrywide practice by arguing that holding DOCAs are invalid.