In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
On 28 March 2017, the Enactment of Extra-Statutory Concessions Order 2017[3] was made which, amongst other things, enacts ESC3.20. The Order came into force on 6 April 2017.
ESC3.20 disapplied the clawback of input tax credit for an insolvent business that has not paid (or not fully paid) the consideration for a supply. New section 26AA of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 gives broadly the same effect as ESC3.20 in that it “turns off” the disallowance of input tax in cases of non-payment of consideration if:
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
On 11 October 2016, the High Court10 held that statutory interest payable on an insolvency (under rule 2.88(7) IR 1986) is not “yearly interest” for UK tax purposes. Such statutory interest is therefore not subject to UK withholding tax (20%).
The facts of the case are somewhat unusual in that there was a substantial surplus in the administration and the statutory interest was estimated at £5bn. However the decision is a welcome clarification of the position. It also confirms HMRC’s previous guidance on the taxation of statutory interest (subsequently withdrawn).
On 29 November 2016, the First-tier Tribunal9 held that the issue of growth shares to certain key employees had inadvertently caused an existing class of ordinary shares to carry a preferential right to assets on a winding up. The effect of this was that both prior ordinary share issues, and future share issues, failed to meet the requirement of the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) rules.
On 17 June 2016, the First-tier Tribunal (in Farnborough Airport Properties Ltd v HMRC2) held that the appointment of a receiver over a (would-be surrendering) group company meant that “arrangements” were in place for the company to no longer be under the same “control” as would-be claimant group companies.
In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.
The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.