On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

Part 1 of this series described the recent decision of the ISDA Americas Determinations Committee to declare that a “failure to pay” had occurred with respect to iHeartCommunications Inc., notwithstanding that the only non-payment had been to a wholly owned subsidiary. The non-payment was orchestrated to avoid a springing lien that would have been triggered had all the notes of a particular issue of iHeartCommunications debt been paid in full. It did not reflect on the creditworthiness of iHeartCommunications.

As the saga of the Paragon Offshore plc bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Del., No. 16-10386 (CSS)) continues, it is useful to reflect upon Judge Sontchi’s denial of confirmation of its bankruptcy plan last November. In a 70-page ruling examining the feasibility of the plan in detail, Judge Sontchi concluded that the plan proposed by the debtors was not feasible because their business plan was not reasonable, and Paragon would not be able to refinance its debt in 2021 at maturity. Balance sheet solvency upon exit was not prioritized in the court’s analysis.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.

On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case raising the question of whether a debtor's chapter 11 plan is confirmable when it proposes an auction sale of a secured creditor's assets free and clear of liens without permitting that creditor to "credit bid" its claims but instead provides the creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its secured claim. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166 (cert. granted Dec. 12, 2011).

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.