On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.
In Short
The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid certain transfers of a debtor's property and to recover the property or its value from the transferees is an essential tool in maximizing the value of a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could, if followed by other courts, curtail a trustee's avoidance and recovery powers. In Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (In re Generation Resources Holding Co.), 964 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2020), reh'g denied, No.
Introduction
Derivative Standing
Dura Automotive
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The McClatchy Company
Outlook
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is a well-established means of generating value for the estate from litigation recoveries. However, in a series of recent decisions, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy state law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).
In This Issue:
U.S. Supreme Court: Creditors May Immediately Appeal Denials of Automatic-Stay Relief
Un emprunteur qui, sans en avoir le droit, ne paierait pas l'échéance d'un crédit entre le 12 mars 2020 et l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cessation de l'état d'urgence sanitaire (lui-même censé durer deux mois à compter du 24 mars 2020 sauf report), pourrait arguer que la clause d'exigibilité anticipée du crédit et la clause d'intérêts de retard (une clause pénale) ne pourront produire leurs effets qu'à compter de l'expiration de cette période en application de l'ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 prise en application de la loi d'urgence n° 2020-290 du 23 mars
A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.