In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

This is the final installment in a three-part series on letters of credit by attorneys in Fox Rothschild’s Financial Restructuring & Bankruptcy Practice. Part I focused on the advantages of letters of credit as a credit enhancement tool.

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

I just had an interesting discussion with a partner on the subject of the sale of exempt property in bankruptcy.  We concluded that even though tenant by the entireties real estate might be exempt from creditor claims in some states, nonetheless in bankruptcy it is still property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541 and subject to the bankruptcy trustee’s general powers of sale under Code section 363(b).  The analysis goes like this:  section 541 creates a bankruptcy estate that includes all interests of the debtor in property without mention of exemptions, and sec

What is the impact of a bankruptcy filing on the ability of a franchisee to continue utilizing the trademarks of the franchisor?  

The US Bankruptcy Court in Massachusetts says default rates must be justified as a reasonable measure of damages at the time of the making of the loan and that a floating default rate that can exceed 5% will not be allowed as part of a creditors claim in the borrower's bankruptcy.    The loan was made in 2006 with a contract rate equal to prime at a time when the prime rate was below 13 percent.

The New Jersey Appellate Court has recently ruled that a receiver can be sued for injuries sustained in a building under the receiver’s control.  The case involved a dilapidated apartment building in Passaic and injuries sustained thirteen months after the receiver was appointed by judge overseeing the foreclosure case of the first mortgage holder.  The receiver was charged with responsibility to collect rent; manage, insure and repair the premises; pay taxes and assessments; and “do all things necessary for the due care and proper management of the mortgaged premises.”  Acco