In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

A bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York recently held that section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent a debtor’s creditors from bringing state-law fraudulent conveyance actions that challenge a leveraged buyout of the debtor. Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), No. 10-4609 (REG), --- B.R. ----, 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014).

TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.

A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).

On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding¹ holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.