In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code that may affect secured creditors.^[1] In 2012, the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”). The ABI Commission is composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

In In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (Momentive), the court dismissed a senior lien creditors’ suit alleging that the junior lien creditors breached an intercreditor agreement (ICA) with respect to shared collateral by taking and supporting certain actions adverse to the senior lien creditors.

BACKGROUND

In Lewis Brothers Bakeries, Inc. and Chicago Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2014 WL 2535294 (8th Cir. June 6, 2014)), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a perpetual, royalty-free, assignable, transferable, exclusive trademark license granted in connection with a substantially consummated asset purchase agreement was not an executory contract that could be assumed or rejected by the licensor-debtor in bankruptcy.

In Burcam Capital II, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A., et al, No. 13-00063-8 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Oct. 1, 2013), an adversary proceeding filed in In re: Burcam Capital II, LLC, No. 12-04729-8, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the court held that the Debtor Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that its lender and the special servicer of the loan breached their duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly.