The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

In a recent decision, the High Court held that legal advice taken in relation to certain transactions was not protected by privilege, as there was prima facie evidence that the purpose of the advice was to structure the transactions in a way that avoided the client’s liability to pay local authority care charges and/or as a transaction defrauding creditors: London Borough of Brent v Kane [2014] EWHC 4564 (Ch).

The Court of Appeal has held that claimant liquidators were in breach of an “unless order” for e-disclosure, overturning the High Court’s decision that there was no breach despite the mistaken omission of certain important categories of documents from the list:Smailes v McNally [2014] EWCA Civ 1296. The result was that the liquidators’ claim was struck out.

In the context of joint liquidators’ applications for documents “belonging to” the company or “relating to” its affairs (under sections 324 and 326 of the Insolvency Act 1986), the High Court confirmed that English law applied to determine whether documents could be withheld by the Luxembourg lawyers who were respondents to the application.

The Court of Appeal has held that a settlement agreement, in which the defendant acknowledged that a debt was payable in full and agreed the mechanics and timing of payments, had the effect of excluding the defendant’s right of equitable set-off: IG Index Ltd v Ehrentreu [2013] EWCA Civ 95. The claimant was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the debt. The defendant however remained free to pursue his cross-claim for damages against the claimant.

The government has clarified which claims will benefit from the continued recoverability of CFA success fees and ATE insurance premiums, following its announcement in May last year that there would be a two-year delay to implementation of this aspect of the Jackson reforms for “insolvency proceedings” (see post).

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.

On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case raising the question of whether a debtor's chapter 11 plan is confirmable when it proposes an auction sale of a secured creditor's assets free and clear of liens without permitting that creditor to "credit bid" its claims but instead provides the creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its secured claim. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166 (cert. granted Dec. 12, 2011).

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.