Companies House temporarily paused their strike off processes in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The effect of this was to stay all strike off action. The stay was lifted on 10 October 2020 but stayed for a second time on 21 January 2021.
The second stay was lifted on 8 March 2021 and, absent further significant disruption caused by COVID-19, is unlikely to be subject to a further stay.
In Sarjanda Ltd (in liquidation) v Aluminium Eco Solutions Ltd and another [2021] EWHC 210 (Ch), an application to rescind a winding up order was refused where the application had been made over two years outside of the five-day time limit. That level of delay, allegedly caused by the company negotiating payment of its debts, was not a good enough reason for the breach of the time limit.
Practitioners are likely to be familiar with the provisions of The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (“CIGA 2020”) which introduced new permanent measures to complement the insolvency regime as well as a number of temporary measures to support business dealing with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In 2016, the High Court determined that a person may propose to do something without having a settled intention to do it and dismissed an application for an order removing a fourth notice of intention from the court file. At the time the fourth notice was filed, the director only intended to appoint administrators if a CVA proposal was rejected by creditors.
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
Introduction
Good-Faith Defense to Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers
Stockbroker Liquidations Under SIPA
Madoff
The Second Circuit's Ruling
Outlook
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.
In Short
The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid certain transfers of a debtor's property and to recover the property or its value from the transferees is an essential tool in maximizing the value of a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could, if followed by other courts, curtail a trustee's avoidance and recovery powers. In Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (In re Generation Resources Holding Co.), 964 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2020), reh'g denied, No.