Introduction
Good-Faith Defense to Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers
Stockbroker Liquidations Under SIPA
Madoff
The Second Circuit's Ruling
Outlook
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.
In Short
The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid certain transfers of a debtor's property and to recover the property or its value from the transferees is an essential tool in maximizing the value of a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could, if followed by other courts, curtail a trustee's avoidance and recovery powers. In Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (In re Generation Resources Holding Co.), 964 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2020), reh'g denied, No.
Introduction
Derivative Standing
Dura Automotive
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The McClatchy Company
Outlook
Historically, an assignment of claims pursuant to s. 38 of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”)[1] has only been used in the context of an assignment in bankruptcy. For instance, the use of s.
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is a well-established means of generating value for the estate from litigation recoveries. However, in a series of recent decisions, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy state law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
On July 27, 2020, the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court (the “Court”) released its decision in Great North Data Ltd., (Re),[1] where Justice Handrigan outlined principles for courts to consider when exercising their power under section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) in the receivership proceedings of The Clover on Yonge Inc.[1] (the “Clover Project”) has addressed the question of whether a debtor in receivership can avoid a sales process by redeeming its outstanding debt.