In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
This case1 concerned a challenge to a High Court judgment which was entered against Mr Hanley for failure to repay monies borrowed pursuant to a loan agreement. Mr Hanley asserted that he had never received a letter of demand for repayment of the loan monies borrowed. The Court noted that the notice of demand went, in error, to another Mr Hanley that had no connection to the Defendant.
Freeman V Bank of Scotland plc, Simon Davidson and Lloyd Daly & Associates Ltd [2016] IESC 14
This Supreme Court decision is as a result of an appeal from a judgment of McGovern J in the High Court which was delivered on 29th May 2014.
Background
In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.
Judgment by Cregan J of 6 October 2014
Overview
This case concerned an application by the official liquidator of RQB Limited (in liquidation) (the Company) pursuant to S280 of Companies Act 1963 to determine the legal status of a floating charge dated 10 September 2008 which entered into by the Company in favour of Danske Bank (the Bank) and which the liquidator believes to be unenforceable.
Background
The "2005 Facility"
The Minister for Justice and Equality has made an order which sets the 18th day of January, 2013, as the date on which Part 6 (Specialist Judges of the Circuit Court) of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 comes into operation.
On the 12 December, the European Commission announced the proposal to update Council Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings. They also announce a separate initiative whereby it will be highlighting the differences between national laws that have the greatest potential to hamper an efficient insolvency legal framework across the EU.