On April 5 and June 8, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed bills (the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017 ("FIBA") and the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017) that would allow financial institutions to seek protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

Het is pandhouders op grond van artikel 3:246 lid 1 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) toegestaan om een pandrecht op vorderingen uit te winnen door middel van het opeisen van de vordering. Deze bevoegdheid omvat tevens het recht om zekerheidsrechten uit te winnen die aan de verpande vordering zijn verbonden. Dit is bevestigd in een arrest van de Hoge Raad van 18 december 2015 (ABN AMRO / Marell).

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Pursuant to Article 3:246 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) pledgees have the power to enforce their right of pledge on receivables by claiming (direct) payment of the receivable. This power also includes the right to enforce rights of pledge that in their turn have been granted as security for the repayment of the pledged receivable. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgement of 18 December 2015 (ABN AMRO / Marell).

Het hof Amsterdam heeft in het voorjaar van 2016 een uitspraak gedaan over het ontstaansmoment van vorderingen van zorgaanbieders op patiënten en/of zorgverzekeraars. Het ontstaansmoment van een vordering is relevant om in geval van een faillissement van de pandgever te kunnen bepalen of een vordering (reeds) bestond – en dus geldig kan zijn verpand – of dat een vordering nog niet bestond – en dus niet geldig kan zijn verpand.

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In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.