In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

The Regulator has updated its guidance on assessing and monitoring the employer covenant in order to help trustees apply the defined benefit funding code of practice (“the Code”).

The guidance is intended to identify good practice for trustees in:

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

In the recent decision of Horton v Henry [2014] EWHC 4209 (Ch) the High Court held that a Bankrupt’s unexercised rights to draw his pension did not represent income to which the Bankrupt was entitled within the meaning of section 310(7) of the Insolvency Act 1986 and so refused to make an Income Payments Order. This contradicted the controversial decision in Raithatha v Williamson [2012] EWHC 909 (Ch) and has created uncertainty as to which is the correct position. The Horton case is being appealed.

The High Court has held that a bankrupt’s unexercised rights to draw his pension did not represent income to which the bankrupt was entitled and so refused to make an income payments order, contradicting the controversial decision in Raithatha v Williamson which held that a bankrupt’s right to draw income from a personal pension may be subject to an income payments order even if the individual has yet to draw his pension.

Horton v Henry [2014] EWHC 4209 (Ch)

Since the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 (“1999 Act”), it has been understood that the rights of a bankrupt under a tax approved pension plan are excluded from the bankruptcy estate and do not vest in his Trustee in Bankruptcy.

That said, where a Bankrupt was already drawing an income from his pension, his Trustee could seek an Income Payments Order over that income.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.