In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

Companies restructuring under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”) depend on a supply of critical products and services in order to continue operations during the proceedings. An interruption in the supply of such goods and services would likely be fatal to any restructuring. Prior to 2009, the CCAA was silent about how the post-filing supply of such goods and services was to be obtained. The CCAA provided only that a supplier could not be forced to supply on credit.

In Re LightSquared LP, the Ontario Court of Superior Justice [Commercial List] (the “Canadian Court”) refined the test for determining the location of a debtor’s center of main interest (“COMI”) under Part IV of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”), which is the Canadian equivalent of Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

On Tuesday, June 5, 2012 the Supreme Court of Canada heard an appeal of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Re IndalexLimited (“Indalex”). The Indalex decision concerned, among other things, the priority of a deemed trust for certain unpaid pension amounts over the super-priority charge granted in favour of a DIP Lender.

Synopsis

In the latest decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court (the “Court”) regarding the bankruptcy of Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. (“TLT”), the Court found that unpaid remittances owed by TLT to third party benefit providers constituted “wages” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA). This entitled the benefit providers to super priority secured status in the bankruptcy of TLT.

The Facts

In the latest decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court (the “Court”) regarding the bankruptcy of Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd.