In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
A recent court ruling is a good reminder to health care providers that bankruptcy may not (as is sometimes suggested) be a safe harbor for providers in danger of being forced out of business by the loss of their Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements.
In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code definition of “intellectual property” does not explicitly include “trademarks.”1 This has led to trademark licensees losing their rights to use the trademark upon rejection of the license in bankruptcy.
Almost every significant bankruptcy case eventually involves preference demands and litigation. Around this abundance of litigation developed a significant body of jurisprudence, to which Judge Sean Lane of the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court recently added in clarifying the ordinary course of business preference defense.
On May 28, 2014, the District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed an order from the bankruptcy court in Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, et al.1, approving a sale of the Debtor’s assets, but found that the Debtor’s commercial tenant was entitled to remain in possession of the premises for the remainder of the lease at the specified rent.
In In re Interstate Bakeries Corporation, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. 2012) (IBC), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a perpetual, royalty-free trademark license was an executory contract and therefore subject to assumption or rejection by a bankruptcy debtor. This decision is at odds with a recent decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), which found that such a license under similar circumstances was not an executory contract and could thus not be assumed or rejected by the bankruptcy debtor.