Congress and the President finally extend the $7.5 million debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility:

• by “unanimous consent” in the Senate;
• by a vote of 392 – 21 in the House; and

A legislative history of the new law is at this link.

The new law is bi-partisan and uncontroversial. But there are some bells and whistles, as discussed below.

“SUNSET” – Again!

It seems like a small thing: Chapter 11 debtors in two states paying lower quarterly fees than Chapter 11 debtors in the other 48 states.

What’s the big deal?

Alabama and North Carolina throw a political hissy fit, three or four decades ago. They want their own Bankruptcy Administrator system (not the U.S. Trustee system established everywhere else). And they are rewarded. The reward includes lower quarterly fees.

Where’s the harm in lower quarterly fees? What follows is an attempt to:

“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”

–U.S. Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause (Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 4).

An Old Losing Streak—Article III

“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”

–Art. I, Sec. 10, U.S. Constitution

Increasingly, states are expanding their laws on debtor/creditor relationships, such as receiverships and assignments for benefit of creditors.

Some of these expansions look suspiciously like a Bankruptcy Code Lite—e.g., adding “stay” provisions.

And that can be a constitutional problem, according to long-standing (and recent) opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court.

What follows is a brief summary of three such opinions.

This is reality:

• Small businesses reorganize, all the time, under Subchapter V;
• Farmers reorganize, all the time, under Chapter 12; and
• Large businesses reorganize, all the time, under regular Chapter 11.

That’s because all of those three types of debtors have bankruptcy reorganization processes designed specifically for them.

Middle Market Debtors

What the heck does this mean:

“(1) Debtor.—The term ‘debtor’— . . . (B) does not include— . . . (Iii) any debtor that is an affiliate of an issuer, as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c)”

—from Subchapter V’s eligibility statute, § 1182 (emphasis added).

Since the inception of Subchapter V, I’ve been trying to figure that meaning out.

Here’s the progression of thinking:

How are private practice mediators compensated in a bankruptcy case—procedurally?

We have a new court order providing guidance on how such procedures can work.

The new guidance is from Sears Holding Corp. v. Lampert (In re Sears Holdings Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 19-08250, SDNY Bankruptcy Court. 

Mediation Order

“Trillions of dollars”: That’s the amount of civil penalty claims a group of 40 States are asserting against Johnson & Johnson for consumer protection law violations. [Fn. 1]

Such civil penalty claims:

Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) sold baby powder for decades.

Today, J&J is facing tens of thousands of lawsuits alleging that its baby powder causes cancer. And the number of new cancer claimants is increasing daily—with many thousands yet to be identified over decades to come.

So, J&J turns to bankruptcy to address this litigation threat, to protect future claimants, and to protect the going concern value of its global operations. [Fn. 1]

Johnson & Johnson and its affiliates (“J&J”) have been selling baby powder for decades.

Along the way, studies began showing that talc in J&J’s baby powder can cause ovarian cancer and mesothelioma. So, since 2016, over 38,000 lawsuits have been filed against J&J contending its baby powder talc causes cancer.

In July of 2018, the talc litigation against J&J built-up serious steam when a jury awarded 22 women a $4.69 billion (yes, with a “b”) verdict against J&J—an appellate court reduced the verdict to $2.25 billion.