Judgment was handed down last week on the substantial directors' duties and wrongful trading claims brought against former directors of various BHS companies^[1].

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

We are increasingly seeing requests from borrowers to carve-out assets from the scope of a lender's otherwise all asset English security package. Whilst there may be commercially sensible reasons for this request, lenders should be aware of the potential impact on their enforcement rights before agreeing to this.

Since the introduction of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) and the creation of the new Part 26A restructuring plan procedure, questions have been raised about whether the cost of using such a procedure would restrict its use to larger, better capitalised companies.

The long awaited Sequana Supreme Court judgment[1] has provided some welcome clarity around the duties of the directors of a company in the "twilight zone" – i.e. where the company is facing financial difficulties.

To promote the finality and binding effect of confirmed chapter 11 plans, the Bankruptcy Code categorically prohibits any modification of a confirmed plan after it has been "substantially consummated." Stakeholders, however, sometimes attempt to skirt this prohibition by characterizing proposed changes to a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan as some other form of relief, such as modification of the confirmation order or a plan document, or reconsideration of the allowed amount of a claim. The U.S.

As outlined in our previous briefing note on the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, a new restructuring tool was introduced in June 2020 in the form of the Part A1 free-standing moratorium (the "Moratorium").

One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

The High Court has dismissed a challenge to Caffe Nero's company voluntary arrangement (CVA) in Young v Nero Holdings Limited. The Applicant in the proceedings, Mr Young, was a landlord of premises let to the First Respondent, Nero Holdings Limited (the Company) and challenged the Company's CVA under s 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the Act).