Summary: In EPC Constructions India Ltd. v. Matix Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme Court addressed whether holders of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares can initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, as financial creditors. The Court held that preference shareholders are not creditors and cannot trigger insolvency proceedings, as preference shares remain part of the share capital even upon maturity, and conversion of debt into preference shares permanently extinguishes the original creditor relationship.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), was enacted to inter alia provide a consolidated framework to resolve insolvency in a time-bound manner and to maximise the value of assets. This objective is further aided by a moratorium under Section 14 that halts legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, and the immunity provision under Section 32A, which offers a fresh slate to resolution applicants upon plan approval.
Introduction
For initiating proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”), categorisation of a creditor as either a “financial creditor” or an “operational creditor” is a rather significant first step. Such categorisation is not merely organisational, but essential since the rights, obligations and procedural requirements for realisation of debt by financial and operational creditors also differ under the IBC.
Introduction
Group Insolvency: Introduction
Group means two or more enterprises, which directly or indirectly are in a position to exercise 26% or more voting rights in other enterprise or appoint more than 50% members of the Board of Directors in the other enterprise or control the management or affairs of the other enterprise.[1]
The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.
To promote the finality and binding effect of confirmed chapter 11 plans, the Bankruptcy Code categorically prohibits any modification of a confirmed plan after it has been "substantially consummated." Stakeholders, however, sometimes attempt to skirt this prohibition by characterizing proposed changes to a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan as some other form of relief, such as modification of the confirmation order or a plan document, or reconsideration of the allowed amount of a claim. The U.S.
One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.