We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.
Publicly, Diamond Finance Co. (“Diamond”) provided car loans to individuals with less-than-stellar credit. While Diamond did have “some actual business,” its purpose “quickly became a front to lure unsuspecting investors.”
Judge Jacqueline P. Cox recently found that three Illinois attorneys violated their ethical obligations by failing to return their client’s phone calls. She thus ordered the attorneys to return half of their already-court-approved, and paid, flat fee.
In In re: Dennis Molnar, 19-bk-09525, 2024 WL 190919 (Jan. 17, 2024 N.D, Ill.), the debtor filed a petition seeking relief under chapter 13. Originally, three attorneys from the same firm represented the debtor. The attorneys appeared pursuant to a “no look,” flat-fee program for chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys.
After years of litigation involving state, federal, Irish, and (to a lesser extent) Swiss law; transfers of numerous assets, including Ireland’s priciest-personal residence; a jury trial; and extensive post-trial briefing, the Second Circuit made short shrift of a former real estate mogul and his ex-wife’s appeal of a judgment rendered against them for fraudulent conveyances.
Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.
The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.
On June 6, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed the chapter 11 plan of bedding manufacturer Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, "Serta"). In confirming Serta's plan, the court held that a 2020 "uptier," or "position enhancement," transaction (the "2020 Transaction") whereby Serta issued new debt secured by a priming lien on its assets and purchased its existing debt from participating lenders at a discount with a portion of the proceeds did not violate the terms of Serta's 2016 credit agreement.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.
Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.
Bankruptcy Judge James J. Tancredi appeared to give a chapter 7 debtor one last chance to avoid being incarcerated.