Overview: The Fifth Circuit’s highly anticipated decision on December 31, 2024, in the Serta Simmons case has significant implications for borrowers and lenders in financial distress situations. The issue on appeal concerned an uptier transaction, a liability management exercise sometimes referred to as “lender-on-lender violence.” The Fifth Circuit’s opinion addresses the contractual viability of uptier transactions and the enforceability of related indemnities in bankruptcy plans, potentially reshaping the landscape for future financial restructurings.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

What happens to funds recovered by the trustee after the final plan payment is made in a chapter 13 case? According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Iowa, absent a plan provision providing otherwise, those funds revert to the debtors.

The debt purchaser in In re McIntosh argued that because it was enforcing a debt that was not listed correctly on the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules, it was entitled to assume the debt had not been discharged. The U.S.

On January 2, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed an amicus curiae brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to reverse a district court’s decision finding that a debt collector lacked the requisite knowledge and intent to violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when it sent a debt-collection communication prior to any knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.