Summary

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut recently examined a question at the heart of an existing circuit split regarding the consequences of trademark license rejection in bankruptcy: can a trademark licensee retain the use of a licensed trademark post-rejection? In re SIMA International, Inc., 2018 WL 2293705 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).

In Short

The Background: The administrators of an Australian auction house and gallery business applied to the Federal Court of Australia for directions to recover in excess of $1 million in fees and costs incurred with respect to performing a stocktake of the auction house's inventory and returning consigned goods to owners.

The Issue: Did an equitable lien exist over the consigned goods in favour of the administrators for their fees and costs and, if so, could the administrators recover those fees and costs?

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

The Federal Court of Australia has provided judicial guidance about what constitutes taking possession by seizure under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) ("PPSA"). Knauf Plasterboard Pty Ltd v Plasterboard West Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2017] FCA 866 indicates that a receiver taking possession of personal property in accordance with a valid security agreement will not perfect a security interest by way of possession.

Background

In Short

The Situation: Frequently, the statutory moratorium period provided to voluntary administrators to restructure an insolvent company is too short to find a solution. Administrators often utilise "holding" deeds of company arrangement to extend the period of moratorium and "buy" time to investigate potential restructuring opportunities for the future of the company. A creditor recently challenged this industrywide practice by arguing that holding DOCAs are invalid.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.