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In spring 2020, the Czech Republic, like the rest of the world, was severely affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The spread of COVID-19 outbreaks led to drastic shutdowns and reduced operations in almost all sectors of the economy. The loss of income and suspension of payments threatened to lead to the insolvency of thousands of businesses. So in spring 2020 the Czech Parliament approved temporary statutory measures to prevent the collapse of the business sector due to formal insolvency proceedings (the so-called Lex COVID).

Lockdown, shutdowns, drops in revenue and related negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic faced by companies even still operating and in a healthy state have prompted the Czech government to respond to this situation and implement statutory measures to mitigate such impacts (the so-called LEX COVID), also in the area of insolvency. Most of such measures are only temporary during the extraordinary measures taken by public authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic. LEX COVID, which brings the below-mentioned changes, has already been enacted and came into force on 24 April 2020.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., holding that “Section 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.” At issue is whether the phrase “right . . . to receive payment” forecloses “more than formal amendments to payment terms that eliminate the right to sue for payment.” The Second Circuit held that it does not.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

Since Marblegate was decided in 2014, the only court to address claims under §316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in the context of a corporate restructuring transaction is

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. on May 12, 2016. One might have thought from the courtroom’s overflow crowd that it was the opening argument in a mob trial, but this is a case about a bond indenture. At issue is whether an out-of-court debt restructuring that did not amend the indenture’s principal and interest terms, but that effectively precluded the noteholders’ ability to be repaid, violated § 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.