The Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., holding that “Section 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.” At issue is whether the phrase “right . . . to receive payment” forecloses “more than formal amendments to payment terms that eliminate the right to sue for payment.” The Second Circuit held that it does not.

Since Marblegate was decided in 2014, the only court to address claims under §316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in the context of a corporate restructuring transaction is

The High Court in London handed down judgment on Part C of the Lehman Waterfall II Application on 5 October 2016.

The judgment examines the extent of creditors’ entitlements to Default Rate interest on debts arising under ISDA Master Agreements governed by English law and New York law. As some £4.4 billion of LBIE’s admitted claims arise under ISDA Master Agreements and the debts were outstanding for more than five years, this judgment will materially influence the amount of money which must be applied in satisfaction of creditors’ entitlements to statutory interest.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. on May 12, 2016. One might have thought from the courtroom’s overflow crowd that it was the opening argument in a mob trial, but this is a case about a bond indenture. At issue is whether an out-of-court debt restructuring that did not amend the indenture’s principal and interest terms, but that effectively precluded the noteholders’ ability to be repaid, violated § 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).