The High Court in Singapore has ordered the winding up of Hodlnaut Pte Ltd, a Singapore based cryptocurrency lending and borrowing platform, as it was cash flow insolvent given that the cryptocurrency funds held by the company from various creditors count as ‘debts’ within the meaning of s125(1)(e) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA).

As a director of a company, the regulatory landscape in England and Wales can feel like a scary place. The possible ways a director can become exposed can feel endless – especially if one asks Google.

Just ask any corporate lawyer fortunate enough to own the tome that is the Companies Act 2006. In the absence of becoming a legal expert, what can directors practically do to best protect themselves when carrying out their role?

This article will discuss whether or not a winding-up petition or bankruptcy petition can be based upon a liquidated amount of crypto which is due and payable by one party to another (a crypto-debt).

An example of such a case could be where party A agrees to transfer 100 widgets to party B in exchange for five bitcoin. Assume party A delivers the widgets, and party B accepts receipt and raises no issue with the widgets, and does not dispute their liability to transfer five bitcoin to party B.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?

Once a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of personal debts, creditors are enjoined from taking action to collect, recover, or offset such debts. However, unlike personal debts, liens held by secured creditors “ride through” bankruptcy. The underlying debt secured by the lien may be extinguished, but as long as the lien is valid it survives the bankruptcy.

A Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan requires a debtor to satisfy unsecured debts by paying all “projected disposable income” to unsecured creditors over a five-year period. In a recent case before the U.S.

One of the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code is to ensure that each class of creditors is treated equally. And one of the ways that is accomplished is to allow the debtor’s estate to claw back certain pre-petition payments made to creditors. Accordingly, creditors of a debtor who files for bankruptcy are often unpleasantly surprised to learn that they may be forced to relinquish “preferential” payments they received before the bankruptcy filing.