The High Court sanctioned Madagascar Oil Limited’s restructuring plan, exercising cross class cram down. The judgment deals with a few now familiar points: what is the relevant alternative? Can it be a different deal? As well as touching on a few novel ones in an unusual two class only plan: was there in fact an in the money class enabling cross class cram down? Almost a third of the judgment is devoted to international recognition and effectiveness of the plan in Madagascar and Mauritius, an unusually detailed analysis, but required here given the specific facts of the case.

On 28 March 2020, the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, announced new insolvency measures to support companies under pressure as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. In summary, the government is due to: (i) implement the landmark changes to the corporate insolvency regime that were announced in August 2018 (as discussed in Weil’s European Restructuring Watch update on 7 September 2018); and (ii) temporarily and retrospectively suspend wrongful trading provisions for three months.

Proposed Changes to the Corporate Insolvency Regime

Background

On 6 March 2020, the restructuring of Doncasters Group's 1.22 billion funded debt was completed. Following a successful non-core disposals program, the Doncasters Group (a leading worldwide supplier of high quality engineered components for the aerospace, industrial gas turbine and specialist automotive industries) operates from 12 principal manufacturing facilities based across the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Mexico and China.

Over the last two years, BEIS has issued a number of consultations either focussed on, or touching upon, corporate governance issues in insolvency or the broader insolvency framework.

Courts and professionals have wrestled for years with the appropriate approach to use in setting the interest rate when a debtor imposes a chapter 11 plan on a secured creditor and pays the creditor the value of its collateral through deferred payments under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Bankruptcy Code. Secured lenders gained a major victory on October 20, 2017, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a market rate of interest is preferred to a so-called “formula approach” in chapter 11, when an efficient market exists.

Post-judgment interest is not something most lenders consider when making a loan. In fact, it is not ordinarily the subject of significant analysis even when litigation becomes necessary. Where the United States District Court is the preferred venue, however, parties easily can fall into the quandary of being stuck with the federal statutory post-judgment interest rate, which is currently less than 1% per annum.

In an appeal certified directly from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) to the Court of Appeals, the Third Circuit issued a ruling upholding Judge Kevin Gross’s decision that a chapter 11 debtor-employer may reject the continuing terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, despite that the CBA expired post-petition.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision

On January 17, 2014, Chief Judge Kevin Gross of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision  limiting the right of a holder of a secured claim to credit bid at a bankruptcy sale. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc.,  Case No. 13-13087-KG, 2014 WL 210593 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014). Fisker raises significant issues for lenders who  are interested in selling their secured debt and for parties who buy secured debt with the goal of using the debt to  acquire the borrower’s assets through a credit bid.

The absolute priority rule of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a fundamental creditor protection in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In general terms, the rule provides that if a class of unsecured creditors rejects a debtor’s reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity interestholders may not receive or retain any property under the plan. The rule thus implements the general state-law principle that creditors are entitled to payment before shareholders, unless creditors agree to a different result.