The High Court sanctioned Madagascar Oil Limited’s restructuring plan, exercising cross class cram down. The judgment deals with a few now familiar points: what is the relevant alternative? Can it be a different deal? As well as touching on a few novel ones in an unusual two class only plan: was there in fact an in the money class enabling cross class cram down? Almost a third of the judgment is devoted to international recognition and effectiveness of the plan in Madagascar and Mauritius, an unusually detailed analysis, but required here given the specific facts of the case.
On 28 March 2020, the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, announced new insolvency measures to support companies under pressure as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. In summary, the government is due to: (i) implement the landmark changes to the corporate insolvency regime that were announced in August 2018 (as discussed in Weil’s European Restructuring Watch update on 7 September 2018); and (ii) temporarily and retrospectively suspend wrongful trading provisions for three months.
Proposed Changes to the Corporate Insolvency Regime
Background
On 6 March 2020, the restructuring of Doncasters Group's 1.22 billion funded debt was completed. Following a successful non-core disposals program, the Doncasters Group (a leading worldwide supplier of high quality engineered components for the aerospace, industrial gas turbine and specialist automotive industries) operates from 12 principal manufacturing facilities based across the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Mexico and China.
Over the last two years, BEIS has issued a number of consultations either focussed on, or touching upon, corporate governance issues in insolvency or the broader insolvency framework.
Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.
A bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York recently held that section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent a debtor’s creditors from bringing state-law fraudulent conveyance actions that challenge a leveraged buyout of the debtor. Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), No. 10-4609 (REG), --- B.R. ----, 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014).
TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.
A Western District of New York bankruptcy court has held that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to leveraged buy-outs of privately held securities. See Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), No. 12-1145 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013).
On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding1 holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.
Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc1 case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.