When an employer is insolvent and administrators appointed, job losses are often an inevitable consequence. In this blog we look at the legal obligations arising where redundancies meet the threshold for collective consultation, and the implications for administrators arising out of the recent Supreme Court in the case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another.

When does the legal obligation to collectively consult apply?

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

Employees working for an insolvent company will have to be given at least 30 days’ notice of redundancy under new legislative reforms to be introduced by the Government. The proposal is part of a new Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment Action Plan to boost the rights of employees hit by insolvency.

Currently, collective redundancies cannot take effect until after a statutory 30 day period of notification to employees. This does not apply to collective redundancies triggered by insolvency but the Government is now planning to remove that exemption.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

On 24 February, the Government published draft regulations that, if implemented, will impose new restrictions on pre-pack administration sales to connected parties. For all `substantial disposals' (which will include `pre-pack' sales) to connected parties, taking place within eight weeks of the administrators' appointment, the administrators will either need creditor consent or a report from an independent `evaluator'.

Context

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.