Introduction

We’ve written extensively here, here, and

Overview

Introduction

In re Katy Indus., Inc., 590 B.R. 628 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) presented an interesting question: If a stalking horse bidder’s successful bid to purchase a company in chapter 11 was partially predicated upon a credit bid, and a portion of that credit bid was challenged after the sale closed, what would be the result for the bidder’s overall successful bid if that portion of the credit bid was eliminated?

Background

Among the many protections afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the estate’s ability to avoid transfers made before the petition date that benefit certain creditors at the expense of others. These so-called avoidance actions are primarily governed by Sections 544, 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which set forth the requirements for challenging prepetition transfers as preferential or fraudulent.

Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code grants secured creditors the right to credit bid up to the full amount of their claim as a form of currency to bid to purchase assets securing their claim from a debtor in connection with a stand-alone sale of assets under section 363(b). In a recent opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Aerogroup International, Inc., Judge Kevin J.

Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (KEIPs) often are the subject of intense interest, either because a distressed company’s management is focused on developing such programs to retain valuable talent during a time of great uncertainty within its organization or because certain creditor constituencies or parties in interest take issue with the payments a debtor intends to make under the programs.

The power of a debtor or trustee to avoid preferential transfers that benefit certain creditors over others is critical to achieving one of the primary tenets of the Bankruptcy Code – the equality of treatment among all creditors. This ability to recover preferences prevents a debtor from favoring certain creditors over others by transferring property in the time leading up to a bankruptcy filing. Although these preference powers are broad, they are restrained by certain conditions, including a minimum threshold on amounts that can be avoided.

What happens when the counterparties on both sides of a contract are debtors in separate bankruptcy cases and their estates have contrary views about whether to reject or assume a contract?

As avid blog readers know, we’ve posted extensively on make whole issues, including several articles covering the ongoing make whole litigations in the chapter 11 cases of Energy Future Holdings and its affiliated debtors, which can be found here,