簡介

2020 年 11 月 12 日，破產管理署發出 2020 年第 2 號通告，當中載列關於臨時清盤人或清盤 人向破產管理署署長提交表格 D1 及 D2 的經修訂安排（「通告」）。臨時清盤人／清盤人 （統稱「清盤人」）如知悉董事有任何不當行為操守，須向破產管理署署長提交法定表格 D1。通告將於 2020 年 12 月 1 日生效。

現有安排

如無力償債公司的清盤人認為現任或前任董事的行為操守（不論單獨觀之或連同其作為任何其 他公司的董事的行為操守觀之）使該人不適宜關涉公司的管理，則須填妥香港法例第 32J 章 《公司（董事行為操守報告）規例》附表內的表格 D1，向破產管理署署長報告有關事宜。

破產管理署署長在收到上述報告後，如信納符合公眾利益，可根據香港法例第 32 章《公司 （清盤及雜項條文）條例》第 168I 條向法院申請針對任何現時或曾經出任無力償債公司董事 的人士發出取消資格令。

清盤人如認為前任或現任董事的行為操守不適宜公司的管理，即可援引報告規定。該規定同樣 適用於公司成員自動清盤的情況。

新安排

Introduction 

On 12 November 2020, the Official Receiver's Office ("ORO") issued Circular No. 2 / 2020 setting out the revised arrangement on submission of Form D1 and Form D2 by provisional liquidators or liquidators to the Official Receiver ("Circular"). Provisional liquidators / liquidators ("Liquidators") are required to submit a statutory Form D1 to the ORO when they become aware of any unfit conduct of a director. The Circular takes effect from 1 December 2020.

Hong Kong's insolvency system is famous for its lack of statutory corporate rescue procedure ("CRP"). Owing to the lack of CRP, financially distressed companies may only recourse to rescue their business with (i) a non-statutory consensual agreement with major creditors to restructure debts, or (ii) a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622). These options, however, have many problems such as being expensive, impracticable, inflexible and tedious.

Introduction

Among the many protections afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the estate’s ability to avoid transfers made before the petition date that benefit certain creditors at the expense of others. These so-called avoidance actions are primarily governed by Sections 544, 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which set forth the requirements for challenging prepetition transfers as preferential or fraudulent.

Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (KEIPs) often are the subject of intense interest, either because a distressed company’s management is focused on developing such programs to retain valuable talent during a time of great uncertainty within its organization or because certain creditor constituencies or parties in interest take issue with the payments a debtor intends to make under the programs.

What happens when the counterparties on both sides of a contract are debtors in separate bankruptcy cases and their estates have contrary views about whether to reject or assume a contract?

As avid blog readers know, we’ve posted extensively on make whole issues, including several articles covering the ongoing make whole litigations in the chapter 11 cases of Energy Future Holdings and its affiliated debtors, which can be found here, 

Are you feeling a bit of déjà vu?  We certainly are.  As readers know, here at the Weil Bankruptcy Blog we’ve written extensively about make-wholes.  In two previous posts, What the Future Holds for Make-Whole Claims in Bankruptcy: Examining the Energy Future Holdings EFIH First Lien Make-Whole Decision – 

Two recent decisions from the District Court for the Southern District of New York have renewed interest in the Trust Indenture Act and the ability of minority bondholders to use it as a shield to protect their rights in an out-of-court nonconsensual restructuring:  Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v.