Despite recent criticisms of venue selection and cries to limit or curtail various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York demonstrates that the bankruptcy courts may continue to broadly interpret the scope of their jurisdictional reach and the powers and authorities granted to them under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re JPA No. 111 Co., Ltd., No. 21-12075 (DSJ) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.

Overview

Overview

Many businesses are—or soon will be—unable to meet their obligations. Not all businesses in distress are unsuccessful; sometimes, as in the economic circumstances arising from the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and the governmental directives tailored to address the related public health issues, even successful businesses must confront closures and steep declines in demand that could not have been anticipated, and may find it necessary or desirable to restructure their existing debt obligations.

Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code grants secured creditors the right to credit bid up to the full amount of their claim as a form of currency to bid to purchase assets securing their claim from a debtor in connection with a stand-alone sale of assets under section 363(b). In a recent opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Aerogroup International, Inc., Judge Kevin J.

The Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions are a powerful tool for debtors in the plan confirmation process. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be confirmed if, among other things, “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” Once there is an impaired accepting class, and assuming certain requirements are met, the plan may then be “crammed down” on all other classes of impaired creditors that reject the plan and those creditors will be bound by the terms of a plan they rejected.

We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)

For those interested in a quick read with some juicy facts and egregious acts by the relevant practitioners, check out the recent opinion in Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an order denying approval of a proposed settlement agreement was not a final order susceptible to appeal as of right.

One of the more appealing aspects of the U.S. bankruptcy process is the relative ease in which parties in interest may file proofs of claim. In years passed all it took was to mail in a simple form to the bankruptcy court or claims agent and now it is even easier with the advent of email and electronic claims uploading. This relatively easy process, however, often comes with a plethora of invalid or unenforceable proofs of claim.

We’ve previously written on various cases in which parties have sought to save or revive late filed pleadings by arguing those pleadings “relate back” to previously filed documents with varying degrees of success.