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In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and ors[1] (“Sequana”) is a key decision on the law surrounding directors’ duties.

The High Court was required to consider the Supreme Court’s Sequana judgment in Hunt v Singh (below).

What did we learn from Sequana?

Summary

Trustees in bankruptcy can often come up against challenges in dealing with obstructive bankrupts. A bankrupt might ignore communications and requests for interview, fail to disclose information about their assets, or provide partial cooperation which fails to offer any substantive assistance.

Currently, the British Virgin Islands has no legislative framework for regulating third party litigation funding. Until recently, the absence of such a framework led many to believe that the rules against maintenance and champerty still operated so as in practice to prevent litigants from raising funds from third parties to prosecute or to defend claims. In Crumpler v Exential Investments Inc (BVIHC(COM) 2020/0081; 29 September 2020) Jack J clarified that third party funding arrangements were enforceable in the BVI.

Facts
Insolvency Act 2003
Comment


In the Three Arrows case,(1) the BVI Court has endorsed what is believed to be its first extra-territorial order summoning directors of a BVI company (in liquidation) to appear for private examination by joint liquidators.

Facts

Introduction

Where a British Virgin Islands company is struck off the register, its directors and members cannot carry on the company's affairs, commence or defend legal proceedings in the name of the company, or deal with the assets of the company.

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?