In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Key Takeaways

Key Takeaways

Key Takeaways

Key Takeaways

Introduction

In October 2022, the English High Court delivered a long-awaited judgment¹ relating to whether or not certain Bankruptcy Events of Default can be cured under the ISDA 2002 and 1992 Master Agreements ("ISDA Master Agreements") - resolving an issue relating to the suspensory effect of conditions precedent to payments and performance under ISDA Master Agreements raised in the English Court of Appeal earlier in the Lehman administration.

As the UK teeters on the brink of what would appear to be an inevitable recession, new restructuring tools introduced in the UK in 2020 pursuant to the Corporate Insolvency & Governance Act 2020 (“CIGA”) will ensure that issuers and other distressed borrowers can execute more creative and aggressive restructuring strategies than were possible during previous market downturns. A brief summary of the new UK restructuring plan is set out below, together with some examples as to how the restructuring plan is being used in practice.

What is the so-called "creditor duty"?

This is the duty, introduced into English common law by the leading case of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd1 in 1988, of company directors to consider, or act in accordance with, the interests of the company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches, or is at real risk of insolvency.

Background

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?