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In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

In a welcome clarification for administrators, the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court[1], held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an “officer” of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).

Whilst commonplace in the U.S., uptier transactions in which a borrower teams up with a subset of creditors to issue new “super priority” debt by amending or exchanging existing debt documents, have not been widely used in Europe.

However, with increasing macro economic pressures and financial market instability, we may see more European borrowers taking advantage of flexibility in cov-lite debt documentation to implement liability management transactions as an alternative to, or even as part of, more formal restructurings.

In this client alert we set out some of the key lessons from the recent judgment in ABT Auto Investments Ltd v Aapico Investment Pte Ltd [2022] EWHC 2839 (Comm), which considers the validity of appropriation as an enforcement power pursuant to Regulation 17 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 (“FCARs”), the duty imposed on a collateral-taker by Regulation 18 of the FCARs in connection with the valuation of a collateral subject to appropriation, and provides useful guidance on what is “commercially reasonable” in this context.

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?

A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.

A foreign (non-U.S.) company can be dragged unwillingly into a U.S. bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy court has “personal jurisdiction” over the company.

The issue of whether directors, officers, and/or shareholders breached their fiduciary duties to a company prior to bankruptcy is commonly litigated in chapter 11 cases, as creditors look to additional sources for recovery, such as D&O insurance or “deep-pocket” shareholders, including private equity firms. The recent decision in In re AMC Investors, LLC, 637 B.R. 43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022) provides a helpful reminder of the importance of timing in bringing such claims and the use by defendants of affirmative defenses to defeat those claims.

There are distinct advantages to investors sitting on the boards of their portfolio companies, not least their ability to look after their investment and work toward maximising their return. The human capital provided by investor directors can be invaluable in driving efficiencies and creating growth opportunities. The interests of investors, investor directors, and the company will generally be aligned in seeking the success of the business.