A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).

In a highly anticipated decision issued last Thursday (on December 19, 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC that a bankruptcy court may constitutionally confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization that contains nonconsensual third-party releases. The court considered whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits a bankruptcy court from granting such releases.

In the recent decision of Boensch as Trustee of the Boensch Trust v Scott Darren Pascoe [2019] HCA 49, the High Court has clarified whether property held by a bankrupt on trust for another vests in the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy, and the circumstances in which a trustee in bankruptcy will have reasonable cause to lodge a caveat to protect an interest in the trust property.

Background

In the recent decision of In the matter of Parkway One Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NSWSC 1495 (Parkway), Rees J dismissed an application to terminate the winding up of Parkway One Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (the Company) due to inconclusive evidence as to the solvency of the Company and, having regard to the non-compliance by its director of her statutory duties and the likelihood of the Company not being able to service the current and foreseen indebtedness, her Honour held that it would be contrary to commercial morality to terminate the wi

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling yesterday in the First Circuit case of Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, resolving a circuit split that had developed on “whether [a] debtor‑licensor’s rejection of an [executory trademark licensing agreement] deprives the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.” And it answered that question in the negative; i.e., in favor of licensees.

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

In a recent decision, In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 18-10518 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the mutuality requirement of section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed, declining to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.

During this mostly quiet week in restructuring, most of us are either away on vacation (think beach or ski) or home for the holidays, maybe back in our hometowns. For me, it’s always the latter, and home for the holidays is Virginia Beach, Virginia, where I sit while I write this blog post (alas, not the beach vacation some of you may be enjoying; my relatives live about 20 minutes from the beach and the high temperature this time of year is usually in the 40s).