In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.
By an Amended Special Case, Derrington J reserved for consideration by the Full Court of the Federal Court the following question: “Is statutory set-off, under s 553C(1) of the Act, available to the [appellant] in this proceeding against the [first respondent’s] claim as liquidator for the recovery of an unfair preference under s 588FA of the Act?” By majority, the Court of Appeal (Kiefel CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Stewart JJ) held that s 553C(1) of the Act does not entitle the creditor to such a set-off.
Background
In Reel Action Sports Fishing Pty Ltd v Marine Engineering Consultants Pty Ltd, [1] the Court offered a timely warning to liquidators of the dangers of adopting and acting on an incorrect understanding of the ownership of contested property. The Court ordered damages against the liquidator personally, despite his position as agent for the company in liquidation.
Background
Jabaluka Pty Ltd (Jabaluka) was the Trustee of the Morgan Unit Trust, which operated an IGA Supermarket (the Supermarket) from 22 September 2010 to 13 March 2020. This case concerned an application by the Liquidator of Jabaluka (the Liquidator) under s 57 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for an order that the Liquidator be appointed without security as receiver and manager of the assets and undertaking of the Morgan Unit Trust.
In BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and Others, the United Kingdom Supreme Court considered a case on appeal which asked the Court to expand the common law duty of directors in a significant way. The Appellant sought to argue that common law director duties should require directors to have regard to the interests of creditors even in circumstances where their company is solvent.
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Introduction
The Full Federal Court, overturning Flick’s J decision at first instance ([2020] FCA 1759), found that the bankrupt’s main purpose in transferring their property was, in substance, not to prevent, hinder or delay this property becoming divisible amongst his creditors in breach of s 121(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
On 29 June 2022, the Federal Court of Australia made an order vesting an interest in a half share of land in Aaron Kevin Lucan in his capacity as trustee (the Trustee) of the bankrupt estate of Christopher Williams (the Bankrupt Estate).
What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?
In Brooks, in the matter of Tease Hair & Spa Pty Ltd (in liquidation), the Federal Court made orders in favour of the Liquidator, pursuant to section 90-15 of Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations)) and section 47 of the Trustee Act 1989 (Tas) allowing the Liquidator to realise trust property for the benefit of creditors.
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