The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)¹The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.²

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).

In a highly anticipated decision issued last Thursday (on December 19, 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC that a bankruptcy court may constitutionally confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization that contains nonconsensual third-party releases. The court considered whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits a bankruptcy court from granting such releases.

We consider one case illustrating the efficiency of international insolvency proceedings commenced in Ireland, improvements to the efficiency of the appellate courts and one imminent legislative change, which will impose an administrative burden on the holders of security over book debts.

Ireland as an efficient venue for international insolvency

Less than an hour after an oxygen tank exploded on Apollo 13, mission control told the crew to isolate a small tank, containing 3.9 pounds of oxygen.^[1] Days later, that tank provided the oxygen to keep the crew alive while landing back on Earth.

If they had left that tank for even another hour the oxygen in it would have been almost gone.

The appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution has generally been considered a “remedy of last resort”[1] and, for over a hundred years, courts have expressed differing views as to when they could appoint such a receiver.

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling yesterday in the First Circuit case of Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, resolving a circuit split that had developed on “whether [a] debtor‑licensor’s rejection of an [executory trademark licensing agreement] deprives the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.” And it answered that question in the negative; i.e., in favor of licensees.

The Land and Conveyancing Law Reform (Amendment) Bill 2019 (the “Bill”) proposes to broaden the factors that the courts can consider in refusing orders for possession sought by lenders.

The Bill has its roots in the Keeping People in their Homes Bill, 2018, introduced by Kevin “Boxer” Moran T.D., as a private member’s bill. However, the Bill does not go as far as Mr Moran’s bill and, for instance, does not require disclosure of the price paid by a purchaser of the loan.

Background

In a recent decision, In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 18-10518 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the mutuality requirement of section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed, declining to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.

During this mostly quiet week in restructuring, most of us are either away on vacation (think beach or ski) or home for the holidays, maybe back in our hometowns. For me, it’s always the latter, and home for the holidays is Virginia Beach, Virginia, where I sit while I write this blog post (alas, not the beach vacation some of you may be enjoying; my relatives live about 20 minutes from the beach and the high temperature this time of year is usually in the 40s).