The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC (PwC) won another victory in the MF Global litigation when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by former commodities customers (the “Customers”) of MF Global Inc. (“MFGI”). This holding is important for its clear affirmation of the in pari delicto doctrine and as a visible limitation on claims by parties not in privity.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

Compensation to be paid to a bankruptcy estate professional is many times subject to intense dispute. In the case of a bankruptcy trustee, section 326 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a tiered system of compensation based upon the amount of money distributed by the trustee to parties in interest. However, as demonstrated by the recent decision in In re Virgin Offshore U.S.A., Inc., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 233 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan.

On January 7, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion that may have far reaching effects on cases involving asbestos liability.  Companies with potential asbestos liability, and actual and potential asbestos claimants, would be well advised to consider the Court’s opinion.

Imagine: you are a lender that has loaned substantial sums of money to an individual, secured by real property owned by the borrower. After the borrower defaults and negotiations fail, you seek and obtain the appointment of a receiver. But now litigation ensues—about the loan documents, about contract defaults, about interest rates, about foreign law. After a substantial investment of time and money, your trial date draws closer. At some point during this odyssey, your borrower secretly transfers the real property collateral to a newly-created, single-member LLC.

Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.¹ In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w