The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC (PwC) won another victory in the MF Global litigation when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by former commodities customers (the “Customers”) of MF Global Inc. (“MFGI”). This holding is important for its clear affirmation of the in pari delicto doctrine and as a visible limitation on claims by parties not in privity.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
Compensation to be paid to a bankruptcy estate professional is many times subject to intense dispute. In the case of a bankruptcy trustee, section 326 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a tiered system of compensation based upon the amount of money distributed by the trustee to parties in interest. However, as demonstrated by the recent decision in In re Virgin Offshore U.S.A., Inc., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 233 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan.
On January 7, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion that may have far reaching effects on cases involving asbestos liability. Companies with potential asbestos liability, and actual and potential asbestos claimants, would be well advised to consider the Court’s opinion.
Imagine: you are a lender that has loaned substantial sums of money to an individual, secured by real property owned by the borrower. After the borrower defaults and negotiations fail, you seek and obtain the appointment of a receiver. But now litigation ensues—about the loan documents, about contract defaults, about interest rates, about foreign law. After a substantial investment of time and money, your trial date draws closer. At some point during this odyssey, your borrower secretly transfers the real property collateral to a newly-created, single-member LLC.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
Whether a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid at a sale under a chapter 11 plan has been the subject of conflicting decisions rendered by the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.1 The United States Supreme Court has resolved these inconsistent rulings with its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, 2 which affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan.
On October 21, 2010, the New York Court of Appeals (the Appeals Court), New York’s highest appellate court, addressed two appeals, and then issued an important ruling regarding the parameters of the affirmative defense of in pari delicto in suits against outside auditors, holding that the doctrines of in pari delicto and imputation are a complete bar to recovery when the corporate wrongdoer’s actions are imputed to the company.
The Doctrines of In Pari Delicto and Imputation