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No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

Yes, says the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to confirm a chapter 11 plan which contains nonconsensual, third-party releases when such releases are integral to the successful reorganization. The court’s decision in In re Millennium holds that, when the third-party releases are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, the Bankruptcy Court has the constitutional authority to approve nonconsensual, third-party releases.

Background

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC (PwC) won another victory in the MF Global litigation when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by former commodities customers (the “Customers”) of MF Global Inc. (“MFGI”). This holding is important for its clear affirmation of the in pari delicto doctrine and as a visible limitation on claims by parties not in privity.

Compensation to be paid to a bankruptcy estate professional is many times subject to intense dispute. In the case of a bankruptcy trustee, section 326 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a tiered system of compensation based upon the amount of money distributed by the trustee to parties in interest. However, as demonstrated by the recent decision in In re Virgin Offshore U.S.A., Inc., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 233 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan.

On January 7, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion that may have far reaching effects on cases involving asbestos liability.  Companies with potential asbestos liability, and actual and potential asbestos claimants, would be well advised to consider the Court’s opinion.

Imagine: you are a lender that has loaned substantial sums of money to an individual, secured by real property owned by the borrower. After the borrower defaults and negotiations fail, you seek and obtain the appointment of a receiver. But now litigation ensues—about the loan documents, about contract defaults, about interest rates, about foreign law. After a substantial investment of time and money, your trial date draws closer. At some point during this odyssey, your borrower secretly transfers the real property collateral to a newly-created, single-member LLC.

On October 21, 2010, the New York Court of Appeals (the Appeals Court), New York’s highest appellate court, addressed two appeals, and then issued an important ruling regarding the parameters of the affirmative defense of in pari delicto in suits against outside auditors, holding that the doctrines of in pari delicto and imputation are a complete bar to recovery when the corporate wrongdoer’s actions are imputed to the company.

The Doctrines of In Pari Delicto and Imputation