In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

Did you know that if a company is listed on the Interim Permission Consumer Credit Register that the directors of the company need the written consent of the FCA before they can file a notice of intention to appoint administrators (“NOI”), and failure to obtain FCA consent renders any subsequent appointment invalid?

Most businesses that; offer goods or services on credit, lend money to consumers, or provide debt solutions and advice to consumers will be carrying out consumer credit activities, and may well have an interim permission and be listed on the Consumer Credit Register.

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

Months of anticipation culminated in a successful result for the Liquidators of Bilta (UK) Limited (in liquidation) on 22 April 2015 in a pivotal fraud case, whereby the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal involving the ‘illegality defence’, in the case of Jetivia SA and another v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) and others [2015] UKSC 23.

The European Advocate General has today given his opinion in the “Woolworths case” (and two other cases) on the meaning of “establishment” for the purposes of determining when the duty to consult appropriate representatives is triggered under the European Collective Redundancies Directive (the Directive).

The recent case of Husky Group Ltd  (“Husky”) underlines the importance of following your lawyer’s advice and not pursuing the defense of the indefensible.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.