This author—whose practice is heavily weighted toward representation of official committees in large chapter 11 cases—has previously penned articles relating to questions surrounding the permanency of an official committee.

In a recent case, the Victorian Supreme Court said that an accountant ‘would know well that a statutory demand involves strict time frames for response and potentially very significant consequences for a company’. The accountant failed to take appropriate steps to inform the company of the statutory demand.

The statutory demand process

If a company does not comply with a statutory demand within 21 days of service, it is deemed to be insolvent and the creditor may proceed to wind up the company.

A recent court decision considers the legal principles and sufficiency of evidence when a court-appointed receiver seeks approval of their remuneration.

A court-appointed receiver needs court approval for the payment of their remuneration. The receiver has the onus of establishing the reasonableness of the work performed and of the remuneration sought.

In a scholarly, comprehensive and lengthy opinion written by one of the Southern District of New York’s most recently appointed Bankruptcy Judges, the issue of whether the reinstatement of defaulted and accelerated debt requires the payment of default-rate interest and fees was answered in the affirmative, undoubtedly to the delight of lenders everywhere.

Last November we wrote about the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Highland Capital Management, L.P., where the court reversed the bankruptcy court’s approval of a plan’s exculpation clause for non-debtors and limited the universe of parties covered by that provision. Relying on Bank of New York Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm.

While the Judge-made doctrine of equitable mootness continues to beguile and often stymie parties-in-interest seeking to appeal an order confirming a chapter 11 plan (as well as other orders which are on appeal prior to confirmation of a plan), appellants in the Fifth Circuit can continue to rest assured that the doctrine will be applied only as a “scalpel rather than an axe.” That is because in the Fifth Circuit, the doctrine—which can be described as a form of appellate abstention—is applied only on a claim-by-claim, instead of appeal-by-appeal basis.

Last week this author delved into what has become known as the “Texas Two-Step,” the arguments for and against its permissibility and the broader implications for the bankruptcy system.

In recent weeks, a move dubbed the “Texas Two-Step” has leaped from coverage first in publications geared only for the professional restructuring community, then to the mainstream press, then to hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, and now to a full-blown trial ongoing in a New Jersey bankruptcy court.

A Supreme Court in Australia has dismissed an application by a UK company’s moratorium restructuring practitioners for recognition of a UK moratorium and ordered that the company be wound up under Australian law.

The decision provides insights into the interaction between cross-border insolvencies and the winding up in Australia of foreign companies under Australian law.

Introduction

In the matter of Hydrodec Group Plc [2021] NSWSC 755, delivered 24 June 2021, the New South Wales Supreme Court:

It is possible for a trustee in bankruptcy to make a claim to property held by a bankrupt on trust. For example, by lodging a caveat over a home that is held on trust.

A trustee in bankruptcy may be able to make a claim, relying on the bankrupt’s right of indemnity as trustee of the trust. This is because the bankrupt’s right of indemnity, as trustee, is itself property that vests in the trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

Explaining a trustee’s right of indemnity