This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.

Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The primary investment thesis of a private credit lender is simple — get the loan repaid at maturity. Private credit lenders do not make loans as a means to acquire their borrower’s business. There are circumstances, however, where private credit lenders must be prepared to take ownership when the borrower is distressed and there is no realistic prospect of near-term loan repayment. Becoming the owner of a borrower’s business may very well be the loan recovery option of last resort.

Although debtors who file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy generally cannot pay prepetition debts until a plan which complies with the “absolute priority rule” is confirmed, there are a number of now well-established exceptions to this rule.

Virtually every business—regardless of its size, nature (manufacturing, service, professional, tech) or particular industry—is currently suffering significant distress as a result of the unprecedented shutdown of huge portions of the U.S. (and global) economy. It is therefore clear that the number of businesses (and individuals) who will seek bankruptcy protection in the coming months will be enormous.

In a recent decision, the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Southern District of New York reversed a decision of the bankruptcy court in the Sears bankruptcy case that was prejudicial to the interests of shopping center landlords whose tenants become chapter 11 debtors.

Our private credit clients are preparing for the next restructuring cycle and have called us about ultrafast bankruptcy cases. These chapter 11 cases have grabbed headlines because they lasted less than a day. Specifically, FullBeauty Brands and Sungard Availability Services emerged from bankruptcy in 24 hours and 19 hours, respectively. Is this a trend and which companies are best suited to zip through chapter 11?

A. Prepacks, Pre-Negotiated Cases, and Free-Falls

A majority of today’s large Chapter 11 cases are structured as quick Section 363 sales of all the debtor’s assets followed by confirmation of a plan of liquidation, dismissal of the case, or a conversion to a Chapter 7. The purchaser in the sale is often one of the debtor’s prepetition secured or undersecured lenders, which may also act as the debtor-inpossession (DIP) lender and purchase the debtor’s assets through a credit bid, with no cash consideration.

Most observers of the world of chapter 11 bankruptcy cases – and particularly those professionals who practice in that arena – will not be surprised to learn that their individual experiences and anecdotal reports suggesting that the duration of Chapter 11 cases has continued to shrink have been validated by Fitch Ratings, one of the “big three” credit rating agencies. Fitch’s August 7, 2018 report, entitled “Shrinking Length of U.S. Bankruptcies,” provides many useful statistics and analyses of recent and historical trends in chapter 11 cases.

The securities safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) does not protect allegedly fraudulent “transfers in which financial institutions served as mere conduits,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 27, 2018. Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 WL 1054879, *7 (2018). Affirming the Seventh Circuit’s reinstatement of the bankruptcy trustee’s complaint alleging the insolvent debtor’s overpayment for a stock interest, the Court found the payment not covered by §546(e) and thus recoverable. The district court had dismissed the trustee’s claim.