A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.
This author—whose practice is heavily weighted toward representation of official committees in large chapter 11 cases—has previously penned articles relating to questions surrounding the permanency of an official committee.
In a scholarly, comprehensive and lengthy opinion written by one of the Southern District of New York’s most recently appointed Bankruptcy Judges, the issue of whether the reinstatement of defaulted and accelerated debt requires the payment of default-rate interest and fees was answered in the affirmative, undoubtedly to the delight of lenders everywhere.
In Short
The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.
Last November we wrote about the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Highland Capital Management, L.P., where the court reversed the bankruptcy court’s approval of a plan’s exculpation clause for non-debtors and limited the universe of parties covered by that provision. Relying on Bank of New York Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm.
While the Judge-made doctrine of equitable mootness continues to beguile and often stymie parties-in-interest seeking to appeal an order confirming a chapter 11 plan (as well as other orders which are on appeal prior to confirmation of a plan), appellants in the Fifth Circuit can continue to rest assured that the doctrine will be applied only as a “scalpel rather than an axe.” That is because in the Fifth Circuit, the doctrine—which can be described as a form of appellate abstention—is applied only on a claim-by-claim, instead of appeal-by-appeal basis.
Last week this author delved into what has become known as the “Texas Two-Step,” the arguments for and against its permissibility and the broader implications for the bankruptcy system.
In recent weeks, a move dubbed the “Texas Two-Step” has leaped from coverage first in publications geared only for the professional restructuring community, then to the mainstream press, then to hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, and now to a full-blown trial ongoing in a New Jersey bankruptcy court.